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Last week, the Italian Constitutional Court published its reasoning on a judgment
regarding the so-called ergastolo ostativo (life sentence without parole). The
challenged provision excludes persons convicted of serious crimes – primarily mafia-
type – from a series of benefits (for example, permits and conditional release) in the
event that they do not want to collaborate with the authorities. Italy’s Constitutional
Court now held that this provision is not in line with the constitution but missed a
chance to give full effect to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
Almost 20 years of legal doubts
Since its introduction in 1991, many doubts have been raised regarding the
compatibility of Article 4 bis, paragraph 1 of the law on the penitentiary system
with Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Italian Constitution. This article provides that
punishment cannot take the form of inhuman treatment and must be aimed at
rehabilitation of the convicted person.
In its first seminal decision on the issue, the Italian Constitutional Court expressed
serious concerns over Article 4 bis as it would rule out social reintegration for certain
categories of convicted persons. However, the Court did not deem the provision
to be unconstitutional (judgement no. 306 of 1993). Only one year later, the Court
held that Article 4 bis was not consistent with the Constitution as it excluded from
the benefits convicted persons whose limited participation in a criminal organization
would have made it impossible for them to usefully collaborate with the authorities
(judgement no. 357 of 1994). In a subsequent judgement, the Court upheld the same
decision regarding the situation of condemned persons who cannot provide any
valuable information when facts and responsibilities have already been established
without the need for further investigations (judgement no. 68 of 1995).
Since these judgements, however, the Constitutional Court has consistently ruled
out the incompatibility of Article 4 bis with the principle of social rehabilitation of
the offender as enshrined in the Constitution, maintaining that the free choice
of the convicted person to not cooperate is just a criterion adopted by the law in
order to ascertain whether or not the accused is repentant (judgement no. 273 of
2001 and judgement no. 135 of 2003).
A judgement long in the making
On 23rd October 2019, with judgement no. 253, the Court ruled that Article 4 bis,
paragraph 1, violates Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Constitution. There are three
reasons for this. First, under Article 4 bis, improvement of an inmate’s prison
treatment (or its worsening) is made dependent on the choice of collaborating. This
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happens because of an absolute presumption that is founded on the equivalence
between absence of collaboration and rooting in organized crime. However, given
that the sentence would already have been imposed during the trial, it cannot be
admitted that failure to cooperate leads to an aggravation of the sentence itself while
it is being executed for reasons unrelated to the crime committed.
Second, the granting of benefits must always be made after an individualized
assessment on a case-by-case basis in order to understand the pathway to
resocialization possibly undertaken by the prisoner.
Finally, use of an absolute presumption does not make it possible to take into due
consideration the course of time as a factor that determines changes both within and
external to the prisoner (for example, the mafia association may have been defeated
or may have dissolved).
A concrete evaluation is, therefore, required based on elements that make it possible
to exclude both the actuality of relations with the criminal organization and their
restoration.
There have been many negative reactions on the part of legal practitioners
(especially public prosecutors) and politicians who argue that this judgement will
hamper the fight against the mafia and other criminal organizations. Curiously, these
comments were made before the grounds for the decision were made public, so they
do not take into account what the Court upheld and are largely based on the idea
that the Court erased the ergastolo ostativo from the Italian legal order, which the
Court did not do. Put simply, the Court required an in concreto assessment related to
the particular convict and his or her rehabilitation path.
In this regard, one should consider the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court.
As it was upheld in a ruling from the early nineties, if a criminal sanction was not
aimed at rehabilitation of the offender, it would end up exploiting the individual
for purposes of general prevention or social defence, sacrificing them on the altar
of exemplarity (judgement no. 313 of 1990). In order to avoid this, a flexible and
individualized assessment is needed regarding the different interests that the
offender might have (judgement no. 450 of 1998).
Judgment no. 253 of 2019 should be interpreted on the basis of this case law as
an element that further strengthens the principle of social rehabilitation, considered
not as a vague ideal but in its authentic dimension as a constitutional principle that
ideally allows (or better still, requires) separation of an offender from the criminal
behaviour in question. At the same time, if the behaviour imposes a repressive
reaction on the part of the law, the legal order cannot and must not lose hope of the
possibility of a genuine change in the offender.
One should, therefore, welcome this judgement and wait for further developments.
In fact, the Court’s ruling applies only to exclusion from premium permit, but this
precedent does not bode well for exclusion from other benefits also considered
under Article 4 bis.
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Questionable distinctions
There is, however, a particular feature of judgement no. 253: When delimiting the
thema decidendum, the Constitutional Court distinguished between its ruling and a
previous judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court underlined
that the case brought before the Strasbourg Court concerned not only exclusion from
permits but also conditional release and were thus not comparable.
The Constitutional Court was referring to the very recent Marcello Viola v. Italy
(No. 2) judgement, in which the European Court of Human Rights dealt with the
case of a former ‘ndrangheta leader sentenced to life imprisonment for leading a
mafia enterprise active in Gioia Tauro, Calabria, and for being responsible for a
series of serious crimes. During his detention, he advanced two requests for prison
leave and release on licence, stating that the time served in prison had enabled
him to change his life: after his conviction, Viola obtained a degree in biology and
another in medicine, and studied economics; he also severed his ties with the
criminal enterprise. His requests were rejected by the supervising judicial authorities
and by the Court of Cassation on the grounds of Article 4 bis because he had not
collaborated with the authorities.
Thus, his rights of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been
violated as the Italian law obligated him to collaborate in order to be granted the
benefits, without taking into account how so doing could endanger his own life and
the lives of members of his family due to retaliation by the criminal organization.
Furthermore, the law provided for an irrefutable presumption of non-rehabilitation
based on the sole fact of the lack of collaboration, without taking into account the
overall situation relating to the convicted person.
The European Court of Human Rights based its reasoning on three precedents. In
the case of Vinter and others v. the United Kingdom, it  pointed out that
“[i]f […] a prisoner is incarcerated without any prospect of release and
without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed, there is the
risk that he can never atone for his offence: whatever the prisoner does
in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his
punishment remains fixed and unreviewable. If anything, the punishment
becomes greater with time: the longer the prisoner lives, the longer his
sentence. Thus, even when a whole life sentence is condign punishment at
the time of its imposition, with the passage of time it becomes […] a poor
guarantee of just and proportionate punishment.” (para. 112)
In the case of Murray v. the Netherlands, the Court added that periodic review
mechanisms must apply in the case of persons sentenced to life imprisonment in
order to verify whether the sanction may be reduced due to changes in the life of the
criminal which make it evident that detention is no longer justifiable on penological
grounds (para. 100). To this end, as stated in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom, the
criteria and conditions laid down in domestic law pertaining to the review must have
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a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty, and also reflect the relevant case law of
the Court (para. 44).
Even if prisoners have been sentenced to life imprisonment, they must, therefore, be
offered a chance of social reintegration and the prospect of release if rehabilitation is
achieved. This requires an adequate assessment carried out by a competent judicial
authority.
Given these premises, the Strasbourg Court upheld that, on the one hand, failure
to cooperate with justice cannot always be attributable to a choice made by the
prisoner and to his or her lasting association with the criminal organization in
question; on the other hand, it may well be that effective collaboration only reflects
cosmetic rehabilitation arising out of the desire to enjoy benefits provided by the law.
According to the Court, the Italian law on the penitentiary system provides for an
irrebuttable presumption of dangerousness that deprives the prisoner of any realistic
prospect of liberation, thus placing such individuals in the position of never being
able to redeem themselves. Consequently, the personality of the prisoner remains
crystallized at the moment when the crime is committed, excluding the relevance of
subsequent actions or behaviour.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights has, therefore, been
violated and in view of the fact that this violation spreads from a legal provision,
it is systematic in nature and calls for a reform, preferably based on an initiative
of the legislative power. This should allow for a case-by-case assessment to be
carried out by the judiciary, superseding the legislative automatism now in force. In
particular, the judicial authority should verify whether dissociation from the criminal
environment may be expressed in a fashion different from collaboration with the
authorities (para. 143).
Therefore, this distinction made by the Italian Constitutional Court appears
formalistic to a large extent. It is true that the cases leading to judgement no. 253
only involved exclusion from permits on the basis of a lack of cooperation, while
the case brought before the European Court of Human Rights dealt with the denial
of permits and conditional release. However, both cases concerned permits and
consideration of how a possible future issue of the constitutionality of exclusion from
conditional release would lead to the same outcome. Given this, the Constitutional
Court could have recalled the Marcello Viola v. Italy (No. 2) judgement, at least in an
ornamental fashion.
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